Part One: Introduction
One of the most prominent claims made by current United States President Donald Trump whilst on the campaign trail in 2016 was that President Barak Obama was the founder of the international terror group ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). Although this statement has been summarily debunked and President Trump’s statement attributed to his propensity for dishonesty (Politico for example found that 70% of the statements he made during the election were in fact false)[1], some of the very publications which exonerated President Obama for his unilateral role in creating the terrorist group have highlighted that there might be some American culpability with respect to the creation of ISIS. For example, in a 2016 piece for Time Magazine, Justin Worland notes that while President Obama did not single handedly found ISIS (highlighting instead that he has killed thousands of ISIS militants whilst in office) and that contemporary ISIS had its genesis long before Obama was elected president, that the fledgling group that would serve as the forerunner to the terrorist killing machine known today as ISIS was allowed to take root in the region due to the 2003 American invasion of Iraq.[2] And while Time magazine might be considered a mainstay of the mainstream media, other scholars writing in publications with greater analytical rigor and academic currency have echoed these sentiments with respect to America’s hand in the creation of ISIS. But is this true? Has the United States actually either directly or indirectly had a role in the development of ISIS? In this piece it is argued that several American foreign policy decisions have both directly and indirectly fostered the development of ISIS. As such, after examining the roots of ISIS with respect to its genesis, the direct and indirect manner in which American influence has given way to the group’s rise, and possible strategies to effectively neutralize and combat not only ISIS but other forms of Jihadi-Salafism as well, it becomes apparent that the actions of the United States have had a profound effect on fostering the development of ISIS.
Part Two: ISIS Foundations
In this section the genesis of ISIS is examined and the roles of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadiin the group’s formation will be analyzed critically. More specifically, the section will examine Zarqawi’s foundational role in Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, the Salafist ideology, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi pivotal role in transforming Zarqawi’s vision and fledging into the terror powerhouse known as ISIS.
2.1 Roots of ISIS
Long before Barrack Obama would ascend to the presidency and was merely a junior senator from Illinois; a Jordanian national by the name of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi founded a group by the name of Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in 1998.[3]As per al-Zarqawi, the impetus for the group’s formation was the goal of overthrowing the Jordanian government due to al-Zarqawi’s perception that the Jordanian regime was not conforming to a fundamentalist or purist (Salafi) view of Islam. Zarqawi had taken to Salafism from an early age and believed in the doctrine’s demand for a return to theological purity and the traditions of Prophet Muhammad.[4] In the immediate years following the inception of Jama’at al-Tawhid, the group would proceed to undertake a number of plots meant to achieve its Salafist ends. However, according to various sources the group began to attain real notoriety as a direct result of the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq which had the dual effect of destabilizing Iraq and allowed al-Zarqawi’s group a foothold into the region.[5] During this time al-Zarqawi and his group would pledge allegiance to Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda terror network (which was chiefly responsible for the 9/11 attacks) and subsequently change the name of their collective to al-Qaeda in Iraq.[6][7]
Despite a new name however, the Jihadi-Salafist nature of the group remained firmly intact. As such, despite the focal shift from Jordan to Iraq, the group was firmly committed to wage war on any who opposed its brand of Sunni Salafist order and they would harshly oppose both U.S. and Iraqi government troops with a variety of means including the use of child soldiers, civilian human shields, and a litany of infamous suicide bombing campaigns. As the group continued to gain traction and a number of dissatisfied, disillusioned, and disenfranchised Muslims from around the World would join their cause (many of whom were joining due to what they perceived as continued Western persecution in the region),[8] al-Zarqawi began to conceive of himself as a religious leader, in addition to being a military commander, and had a very strong expansionist vision for the group based on Jihadi-Salafi ideals.[9] For Jihadi-Salafis there is no distinction between religion and politics because for them a fundamental interpretation of the Quran not only dictates how one governs the religious aspects of life, but provides the blueprint for governance as well. As such, most Salafis (including those of the Jihadi persuasion who freely utilize violence in achieving their goals) are not political actors in the strict or formal sense of politics, and they also eschew man made law, and most forms of political and civic organization.[10] As such Salafists can be considered, “first and foremost religious and social reformers who are engaged in creating and reproducing particular forms of authority and identity, both personal and communal.”[11] And of course for Jihadi-Salafists like Zarqawi and his group, anyone who does not conform to a fundamental reading of Quran and the Hadith, they are considered infidels whose lives have no value and by extension can be killed without a second thought. In fact, the killing of non-believers and expansion of (fundamental) Islam is what Jihadi-Salafis maintain is in step with the will of God and what will allow them paradise in the afterlife.[12] Therefore, for Jihadi-Salafis, the ends certainly justify the means.
2.2 Rise of ISIS
Despite his aspirations, both on religious and military fronts, al-Zarqawi was killed by United States forces in 2006.[13] However, even without their founder the group would continue to expand and eventually become headed by a new leader. In 2010 after serving approximately four years imprisoned in the U.S. facility Camp Bucca, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi gradually rose through the ranks and eventually rose to the leadership position of al-Qaeda in Iraq by the following year. However, a growing dissatisfaction between his group and al-Qaeda led al-Baghdadi in 2011 to sever ties with them and he subsequently changed the name of his group to the Islamic State in Iraq.[14] However, despite this severance his parallels with Bin Laden and the goals of al-Qaeda remained largely intact as it was still al-Baghdadi’s vision to create a new caliphate (or state) based on Islamic law (with himself as caliph or leader of all Muslims presumably because of his claim of being able to trace his lineage to Prophet Muhammad),[15][16] that would stretch across the Middle East and North Africa.[17]As such, al-Baghdadi and his group have targeted Shiites and others deemed infidels all with the goal of unite the Arab world under a single Sunni regime.[18]Furthermore, once Syria became targeted as a key area of interest, in 2013 al-Baghdadi changed his group’s name again to the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) and this change was certainly a reflection the group’s greater Jihadi-Salafi ambition of expansion.[19]
By 2016 there was no question that the group’s interest in expansion was in any way restricted to the Middle East, as numerous events around the globe were either conducted by the group directly or perhaps more alarmingly, by ISIS affiliates which have pledged their loyalty to the group. In his piece entitled, ISIS Goes Global, Daniel Byman describes both the expansion of ISIS and the impact of its worldwide affiliates:
The downing of a Russian passenger plane over Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula last October (2015), for which the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) claimed responsibility, may prove more consequential than the horrific attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California that followed. Western security officials had long worried that their countries’ own citizens would conduct attacks after returning home from Iraq or Syria or strike out as “lone wolf” terrorists. But he Russian plane crash, which killed 224 people, was called by a different beast neither lone wolves nor ISIS itself but an ISIS affiliate that had pledged its loyalty to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS’ self-declared caliph. ISIS calls these groups wilayat, Arabic for “provinces.”…If, as recent events suggest, ISIS’ far-flung provinces have begun closely aligning their actions with those of the group’s core leadership in Iraq and Syria, then ISIS’ geographic scope has expanded vastly.[20]
In addition to highlighting ISIS’s expansion generally, Byman further highlights that the group an its affiliates, or wilayat, have actually expanded to at least Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Caucasus, Bangladesh and Kuwait.[21]
With respect to resources and having the means to achieve their ends, it has been estimated that ISIS now has approximately 30,000 fighters directly committed fighters[22] and has been deemed one of the richest insurgent groups with holdings of approximately 2.38 billion (which is largely a composite sum fro asset seizure and the sale of seized oil wherein oil revenues alone have been estimated at 1 million to 3 million dollars a day).[23][24][25][26]As such, ISIS appears to have the means for not only a sustained presence in the Middle East, but given its wilayat and also the tenuously linked “lone wolves” which act in its name, ISIS truly appears to be a global threat to anyone who stands in opposition to its Islamic fundamentalist goals.
While this section has revealed that ISIS has morphed from a small network of terrorists into a worldwide Jihadi-Salafist juggernaut, the next section will detail the role the United States and other foreign powers have played in the group’s rise and current state.
Part Three: Examining the Direct and Indirect American Influence of ISIS
Although security studies is currently a very prominent subfield in political science, as Buzan and other scholars have highlighted, there is still no consensus on the term “security” and as such it remains an “essentially contested concept” which “defies the pursuit of an agreed general definition.”[27][28] One of the reasons for the ambiguity surrounding a contemporary understanding of security according to some is because the field has developed more than one interpretation of security.[29]Although subtle differences exist in the spectrum of IR scholars and their individual interpretations of security, conceptions of security have generally fallen between one of two classifications; the traditional school and those security definitions which have become known collectively as the “critical” schools that have sought to present an alternative to the traditional school.
The traditional school of security is firmly grounded in the realist approach to international relations. Inspired by the works of Hobbes and Machiavelli, modern realists like Hans Morgenthau have synthesized a realist blueprint which continues to be one of (if not the) dominant international relations perspectives today. With its emphasis on a volatile and unpredictable future, power is seen by realists as the only currency for securing state interests in an anarchical international system. The concept of power to realists is traditionally interpreted in military terms, and as such, a strong sovereign state prepared to do what is necessary to defend itself has been considered the ideal template to aspire to from a security perspective for many years. Although Morgenthau is regarded as the father of modern realism, perhaps the most succinct interpretation of security that perfectly encapsulates the traditional approach to security is that found in the 1962 piece National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol by Arnold Wolfers wherein he states that, “security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it.”[30] In addition, Wolfers also makes another important contribution to traditional conceptions of security wherein he finds that due to the fact that public opinion might vary dramatically on a variety of state issues and interests, that prudent leaders while acting in the interests of its citizens must not be deterred in undertaking whatever course of action they deem prudent and necessary, no matter how abhorrent in the eyes of the populous.[31]However, the manner in which leaders actually execute their plans and achieve at least tacit support from the people has been usually undertaken through a process called securitization. From scholars like Ole Waever, securitization can be understood as the process through which states designate other states or actors as security concerns.[32]Moreover, states are able to successfully securitize and frame those they deem security threats via what is known as the speech act, which is a vocational effort to discuss security in terms that move topics or potential threats away from politics into an arena of security concern which has the effect of legitimizing any extraordinary measure taken against the constructed threat.[33]As such, not only is securitization a tool that allows the state to frame threats and legitimize extraordinary threats, but it is a powerful conduit through which state and state elites can exert almost unfettered control.
After examining the manner in which the United States entered Iraq post 9/11 there can be little doubt that it did so by using a securitized approach flowing from a traditional conception of security. More specifically, in light of a perceived threat to its security from Iraq due its own vulnerability post-9/11, the United States deemed Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein as an existential threat and through a litany of provocative rhetoric effectively licenced the state to use whatever military measures it wished to defeat its enemy. These measures were not only taken outside the scope of normal domestic politics, but also outside the purview of international law and international institutions as many individual foreign powers and the United Nations as a whole were apprehensive about the unilateral decision of the United States to enter Iraq and destabilize the regime based on dubious accusations of Iraq being in possession of weapons of mass destructions (claims which turned out to be patently false).
As examined in the part two of this work, the United States decision to enter Iraq not only destabilized Iraq, but allowed what is now known as ISIS to gain a foothold in the region and expand their Jihadi-Salafist vision throughout Iraq, Syria, and beyond. Cronin provides an excellent account of how American intervention directly led to ISIS’s current place of prominence:
ISIS came into being thanks to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In its earliest incarnation, it was just one of a number of Sunni extremist groups fighting U.S. forces and attacking Shiite civilians in an attempt to foment a sectarian civil war. At the time, it was called Al Qaeda in Iraq (aqi), and its leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had pledged allegiance to bin Laden. Zarqaqwi was killed by a U.S. air strike in 2006, and soon after, aqi was nearly wiped out when Sunni tribes decided to partner with the Americans to confront jihadists. But the defeat was temporary; aqi renewed itself inside U.S. run prisons in Iraq, where insurgents and terror operatives connected and formed networks-and where the group’s current chief and self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, first distinguished himself as a leader.
In 2011, as a revolt against the Assad regime in Syria expanded into a full-blown civil war, he group took advantage of the chaos, seizing territory in Syria’s northeast, establishing a base of operations, and re-branding itself as ISIS.[34]
Moreover, because the speech act laden and militarized approach utilized to enter Iraq is essentially a microcosm of the same brand of foreign policy the United States’ has employed in the Middle East over the last forty years, it can be stated with confidence that ISIS’s continued presence in the region is arguably the result of a culmination of decades of poor foreign policy decisions towards Arab nations and Muslims of that region generally (for example, the United States had themselves at one time supported and financed Osama bin Laden and other Afgans during the Soviet War in Afghanistan during the 1980s[35] as well as supporting Saddam Hussein during the early part of Iraq’s conflict with Iran[36]).
In addition to the employment of traditional conceptions of security and securitized foreign policy which led to the U.S. entry into Iraq, other direct actions by the United States have accounted for ISIS’s development and include primarily the installation of Shiite leadership in Iraq and also its decision to withdraw much of its forces from Iraq prematurely after the 2003 invasion and in so doing not effectively supporting Iraq and its military. With respect to the former, although Shias and Sunnis are fairly evenly divided with respect to population in Iraq,[37] scholars have noted that Sunnis have been the ones who have traditionally held positions of leadership.[38] As such, the 2006 election of Nouri al-Maliki and the installation of Shiite leadership which was largely the result of US intervention and support (which continues now under Haider al-Abadi),[39] was a dramatic change in the political and social order of Iraq and was met with immediate opposition by many Sunnis who had felt disenfranchised with the new power structure.[40] As such, this in turn gave (Sunni) Jihadi-Salafists a reason to frame Shiites as enemies and more reason to seek control over the region (and now all Muslims) for themselves. In relation to the latter point regarding a lack of sustained support for Iraq and its military personnel, this course of action has been cited by several scholars as the reason ISIS came back from the brink of extermination and regained its strong presence in the region. For example, Cronin notes:
In Iraq, the group continued to capitalize on the weakness of the central state and to exploit the country’s sectarian strife, which intensified after U.S. combat troops withdrew. With the Americans gone,Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pursued a hard-line pro-Shiite agenda, further alienating Sunni Arabs throughout the country…The group’s territorial conquest in Iraq came as a shock. When ISIScaptured Fallujah and Ramadi in January 2014, most analysts predicted that the U.S. trained Iraqi security forces would contain the threat. But in June, amid mass desertions from the Iraqi army, ISIS moved toward Baghdad, capturing Mosul, Tikrit, al-Qaim, and numerous other Iraqi towns.[41]
As such, from the preceding it can be ascertained that not only did the United States vacate the region prematurely, but during its exit it failed to provide adequate assistance both in terms of political guidance to the new Iraqi regime or sufficient training and support to its security forces.
In addition to these direct results, other decisions by the United States have also indirectly led to the creation and sustained mobilization of ISIS. Chief among these reasons have been vitriolic speech acts which essentially dub Muslims as nothing more than a savage “other” which has in turn allowed terror groups to more easily recruit new members,[42][43][44] economic sanctions in Iraq which some have argued has led to the death of not only a great many Iraqis generally, but at least 500,000 children which in turn has served as another reason for Western hatred and terrorist recruitment,[45] the premature release of certain prisoners and the poor management of US prisons in the region which has allowed ISIS members to connect and build their terror networks (al-Baghdadi himself was released from a US prison in Camp Bucca),[46][47] and the failure to admonish and curtail its ally Saudi Arabia for spreading and supporting Salafism across the Middle East which has directly fed Zarqawi, his followers, and Sunni sectarianism in general,[48] are all decisions the United States has made which have indirectly contributed to the current magnitude of ISIS. In addition, although the United States has recently began to take more forceful action instead of appeasement against Bashar Al Assad and the Syrian regime (who although claim ISIS as their enemy, have directly financed the group through the purchase of ISIS controlled oil)[49] evidenced by the recent deployment of military strikes on Syrian airbases in 2017, the lack of a well designed and effective diplomatic strategy which should presumably seek other international actors to stand with the United States to place collective pressure on the Syrian regime (and Russia by extension for supporting Al Assad’s regime), will only serve to create further chaos in the region. And if the lessons of ISIS have demonstrated anything, it is that the group thrives on chaos by utilizing it as a catalyst for expansion. [50]
Part Four: De-Securitization and Effective Strategies to Combat ISIS
From the preceding section it would appear that many of the factors of that have both led to the formation and rise of ISIS appear to flow from the United States employing a securitized approach to deemed threats in the Middle East. As such, perhaps there is another way forward. For example, while the United States and its allies could continue to pursue avenues naturally associated with the traditional school of security studies like animosity laden speech acts, vilifying certain groups of people as perspective threats (even if they are ultimately not), military mobilization, and pre-emptive and/or reactive strikes, some have argued that there is perhaps another more fruitful way. More specifically, while some continue to advocate for securitized approaches, there are other scholars who would argue for a de-securitized approach. In contrast to the traditional school of security and securitization, de-securitization emanates from expanded conceptions of security largely the result of Foucault (biopolitics) and the critical European schools which saw merit in moving away from state centered and military based conceptions of security to one which emphasizes the individual and the best methods for protecting the rights of individuals without the traditional need for violence which they believe only serves to perpetuate insecurity.[51]As such,[52]de-securitization can be described as a process of moving an issue out of the realm of the emergency, where the rules of normal politics are suspended back to the “normal bargaining process of the political sphere.”[53][54] As such, de-securitization can be understood as essentially the process of unmaking an existential threat and also offers promise not only as an alternative to potential armed conflicts and its devastating consequences, but also for actors that are not on an even power level as the securitizing state, be it from a political,military, ally, or wealth perspective. Commenting on de-securitization Abu-Zahra describes it thus as a practical process, that may involve challenging the “social consensus” for securitization, “questioning the policies”, and “disputing the threat.”[55][56]
Given that a de-securitized approach is advocated as an alternative to securitization and securitized approaches, it is not surprising that the options available which flow from this approach generally include such things as diplomatic engagement, an emphasis on non-violent tactics, alliance building, poverty reduction, an appeal to human rights and other civil liberties, and the careful selection of language when defining and framing opposing groups and potential conflicts. And while de-securitization might represent a radical departure from the avenues currently being employed by the United States and others in the region, there are a number of scholars who believe options grounded in the de-securitized approach are the only way to effectively combat ISIS. For example, in her piece entitled ISIS is not a Terrorist Group, Audrey Kurth Cronin highlights not only the futility of a militarized approach but why the complete opposite is needed in the region:
The sobering fact is that the United States has no good military options in its fight against ISIS. Neither counterterrorism, not counterinsurgency, nor conventional warfare is likely to afford Washington a clear-cut victory against the group. For the first time being, at least, least the policy that best matches ends and means that has the best chance of securing U.S. interests is one of offensive containment: combining alimited military campaign with a major diplomatic and economic effort to weaken ISIS and align theinterest of the many countries that are threatened by the group’s advance.
ISIS is not merely an American problem. The wars in Iraq and Syria involve not only regional players but also major global actors, such as Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States. Washington must stop behaving as if it can fix the region’s military force and instead resurrect its role as a diplomaticsuperpower.[57]
As such, while Cronin does recognize the needed for a limited amount of force for the purposes of containment, the crux of an effective strategy to combat ISIS is absolutely premised on diplomacy and economic efforts. While Cronin elaborates on what her interpretation of diplomatic endeavours are, an understanding of economic efforts and strategies is less clear in her piece. Fortunately, in their piece entitled The Effects of Terrorism on Economic Performance: the case of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Alam Khan and Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada examine the impact of terrorism on economic performance in Iraq and Syria from the years 2004 to 2013. More specifically, they apply an economics of crime monitoring model (Ruiz and Ndoma) and conclude that terrorism has badly affected the economic performance of ISIS during the study period.[58] As such, instead of engaging in direct militarized combat against ISIS the authors advocate for agents of the developed world, namely the United States and Europe, to formulate in its place economic strategies that could actually eradicate terrorism by focusing on reducing poverty, religious discrimination and inequality which would increase the opportunity cost of terrorism.[59]More specifically, they state:
The results of the study conclude that the economic desgrowth caused by Iraq during 2013 is -2.58%, while in Syria the economic desgrowth during the same period is -3.20%. These statistics show how much both the economies were badly affected by terrorism during the last decade.
The study suggests that the world community, especially Europe and the United States of America to think about the root causes of terrorism in both of these economies. Instead of fighting against terrorism it is vital to identify the causes of terrorism first and then to overcome these issues which raise terrorism especially in Iraq and Syria…If we want to win the war against terrorism, it is required to eradicate poverty, inequality, and religious discrimination to increase the opportunity cost of terrorism.[60]
In addition to the aforementioned de-securitized approaches which emphasize diplomatic and economic solutions highlighted by Cronin, Khan/Estrada and others,[61][62] addressing some of the factors which have both directly and indirectly lead ISIS’s current level of strength, also would appear to do much in reducing ISIS’ momentum. As such, a combination of the United States limiting speech acts which only serve as inspiration for ISIS’ recruitment, using its alliance with Saudi Arabia to halt the spread of Wahhabism, using its resources to effectively train and support Iraqi soldiers (and possibly Syrian freedom fighters who stand in opposition to both Assad forces and ISIS), and devising real strategies (potentially with the aid of the international community) which place substantive pressure on Russia and the current Syrian regime who have to date only exacerbated ISIS related problems in the region,[63] are all non-violent de-securitized approaches that can effectively reduce ISIS’s impact not only in the Middle East, globally as well.
Although the evidence in this paper suggests that the United States has had a significant impact on the creation and rise of ISIS, options from a de-securitized approach to security offer hope for a viable solution to combatting not only the ISIS quagmire, but all forms of global terrorism as well.
Part Five: Conclusion
After examining the roots of ISIS with respect to its genesis, the different ways in which in which American influence has given way to the groups rise, and possible strategies to effectively neutralize and combat not only ISIS but other forms of Jihadi-Salafism as well, it has become apparent that the actions of the United States have both directly and indirectly fostered the development of ISIS precipitating both its rise and its current state. As noted by several scholars, the United States has a pattern of utilizing extremist forces when it suits their interest, and in this instance American fingerprints can be found all over ISIS’s genesis and rise to prominence as well. It will be interesting to observe what course of action the United States takes now that ISIS has a firm foothold within the Middle East. Will it continue to take a securitized approach rife with divisive speech acts that only alienate moderate Muslims and serve as a rallying cry for ISIS and other Jihadi-Salafi groups, or will it instead enter the twenty-first century and truly espouse a belief in tolerance, welcome the marginalized instead of converting them, and begin to de-securitize prospective threats before they realize their destructive potential. Moreover, in an era of modernity, globalization, and neo-liberal ideals, de-securitization may be the only practical way for the United States and its allies to not only address potential terror threats, but escalating tensions with between nation-states as well. As such, the United States would do well to give de-securitized approaches more attention when drafting foreign policy more generally and not simply limited themselves to those that are terror specific.
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